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1. INTRODUCTION 
This Communication, which is based on two recent Commission reports
1, aims to 
alert policy makers to the recent under-performance of the EU in labour productivity 
growth, its causes and its implications for the goals set by the European Council in 
Lisbon in March 2000 – the Lisbon strategy. It reviews productivity growth against a 
background of policies that are already in place. It points to the political 
determination that will be required if the objectives of the Lisbon strategy are to be 
met. 
The Communication does not cover the entire set of factors that contribute to 
productivity growth. Consistent with recent Competitiveness Reports, its focus is 
narrower: it reviews the particular role of new technologies and of innovation and 
central issues related to these. The Communication constitutes a supplementary 
reflection on the productivity circumstances that underpin the Lisbon strategy. It is 
also intended to provide an opportunity for the European Parliament, the Council, the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, as well as the 
stakeholders, to express their opinion on and debate the EU’s productivity 
performance and prospects, and the policies that are required to raise its rate of 
growth in a sustainable manner. 
Recent trends in EU productivity growth are not sufficient to attain the economic, 
social and environmental objectives set in the Lisbon strategy in the remaining years 
to 2010. The Member States and the Commission must take the political initiative to 
ensure that the structural reforms needed to correct this situation are now carried out 
rapidly. These reforms have already been identified. Unless this happens, the Lisbon 
goal will be missed. 
The Communication discusses factors determining productivity growth within the 
framework of the Lisbon strategy and provides the grounds to raise some central 
questions. The rapid technological developments being experienced by the EU 
require economic life to be organised in new ways to exploit the emerging 
opportunities. Although steps within the Lisbon strategy have already been taken, it 
is crucial to ask whether these steps are sufficient and whether they are being 
implemented with the necessary urgency. Without them, the new technological 
environment will not emerge and producers and consumers will not be able to take 
advantage of their benefits. Piecemeal implementation of the Lisbon strategy will not 
raise productivity and economic growth sufficiently. Only a comprehensive 
approach, where all steps are implemented in a co-ordinated fashion, will succeed.  
Economic growth depends on the accumulation of human and physical capital, the 
growth of the active labour force and on the efficiency with which they are used. The 
ability to obtain more output from given inputs of labour and capital corresponds to 
                                                 
1  The reports in question are the European Competitiveness Report 2001, Commission Staff Working 
Paper, SEC(2001) 1705, 29.10.2001 and the European Competitiveness Report 2002, Commission Staff 
Working Paper, forthcoming. These reports are narrower in focus and inevitably do not examine other 
crucially important aspects of economic growth in the EU such as the role of economic policies, of 
skills, of R&D, of specific employment initiatives such as labour mobility or of the role of education. A 
review of the Commission’s activities in these important areas deserves clearly more than just the 
reference made here.  
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growth in productivity. Productivity growth depends on the quality of physical 
capital, improvements in the skills of the labour force, technological advances and 
new ways of organising these inputs. Historically, productivity growth has been the 
principal source of economic growth. It has made possible an expansion of output, 
not just without concomitant increases in inputs, but with important reductions in 
hours worked over the medium term. In doing so, it has made a sustained rise in real 
incomes possible. 
The recent slowdown in productivity growth in the EU is synonymous with 
deteriorating competitiveness
2. Enterprises will be competitive when they can 
achieve sustainable growth in labour and total factor productivity that permit them to 
beat the costs per unit of output, and the non–cost characteristics, of other firms. This 
is so both on the domestic and on the international level. Such productivity growth 
may make it possible to finance a firm’s expansion plans. But it also offers the 
possibility to a firm to sustain real wage increases. Similarly, the standard of living 
of a country rises when it achieves sustained productivity growth. 
By strengthening the competitive position of innovative firms, productivity gains can 
not only reduce costs per unit of output, but also expand the market for their 
products. Citizens benefit through better products at lower product prices and, in the 
medium term, through increased employment. Even if productivity gains are initially 
restricted to specific sectors of an economy, ultimately they are diffused beyond 
these sectors through changes in relative prices and associated increases in real 
incomes. In general, a country that realises strong and sustained productivity growth 
also sees its standards of living rising rapidly
3. Europe’s golden age of growth and 
convergence in the years following World War II, until at least the first oil shock, 
demonstrates this. 
Despite good macroeconomic performance in recent years, labour productivity 
growth in the EU in the second half of the 1990s failed to measure up to its past 
record. This can only be seen as a particularly adverse development. With 
employment growth traditionally weak, income growth in the EU depends crucially 
on growth in labour productivity. The failure in recent years of labour productivity to 
grow even at its historical pace means that growth in national incomes and in 
standards of living cannot be sustained. 
Productivity growth is determined by a variety of factors. The central message of this 
Communication is that a key determinant of Europe’s recent under–performance in 
                                                 
2  Competitiveness is understood to mean a sustained increase in real incomes and in the standards of 
living of regions or nations, with jobs available for all those who wish to find employment. This is the 
definition used, for example, in the European Competitiveness Report 2001, op. cit. This concept, 
which is different from the narrower concept applying to the competitiveness of enterprises, implies that 
domestic factors are the dominant determinants of competitiveness; see P. Krugman (1994): 
“Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession”, Foreign Affairs, March/April for a discussion of these 
concepts. 
3  Output growth is, by definition, the sum of growth in the labour input and growth in labour 
productivity. Productivity growth and growth in the standards of living are closely related because 
growth of real wages equals the growth in labour productivity. While short–term data might support this 
weakly, over long periods of time the correlation between the growth of real per capita income and the 
growth in labour productivity is robust and very high. For the EU as a whole, the correlation between 
real per capita income growth and labour productivity growth for the period 1980–1985 is 1.00 and 
remains at this value when observations by five–year intervals are added up to and including 2001.  
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productivity growth is insufficient innovative activity as well as under–investment in, 
and weak diffusion of, information and communication technologies (ICT). This has 
had serious consequences in the comparative performances of the United States and 
the EU. The surge in productivity growth in the United States has been sustained, 
even in the midst of the recent economic slowdown. Indeed, the sustained growth of 
United States labour productivity during 2001, a year of recession, is in sharp 
contrast to the conventional pro–cyclical pattern of productivity growth
4. This 
performance reflects the impact of the gains resulting from investments made in that 
nation’s technological and innovation assets. In the United States, the ICT revolution 
has stimulated enterprise re–organization and has altered the terms of competition. It 
has also shifted the demand for labour towards skills suitable for the new 
technologies. In the EU, knowledge-intensive sectors have been driving employment 
creation but productivity developments have been far less favourable than in the US. 
This highlights a number of characteristics associated with countries or regions that 
experience strong and sustainable productivity growth. They include technological 
change, a well-maintained or growing stock of human capital and a vigorous 
innovation environment. In such an environment, opportunities emerge for new firms 
to develop and for existing firms to reform their work patterns and to modernise their 
operations. The competition framework, in turn, is critical for maintaining such an 
environment, for intensive competition spurs innovation, fosters productivity growth 
and contributes to competitiveness. 
Further, productivity growth is an important part of the broad issue of environmental, 
social and economic sustainability. For productivity growth determines eco-
efficiency, industry’s output relative to resource use or pollutant emission. 
Productivity growth is therefore part of both economic and environmental 
sustainability. 
All these characteristics can be influenced by public policy, which therefore can have 
an important influence on productivity performance. That is why it is important that 
the poor productivity performance of the EU is understood, as are its causes and 
consequences. The chapters that follow seek to contribute to this understanding and 
to an appreciation of the political issues at stake. 
                                                 
4  Productivity growth tends to decline during a recession and to recover during the recovery phase of the 
economic cycle, a reflection of the fact that firms hoard labour. United States productivity growth has 
continued at a robust rate despite the slowdown in economic activity during last year. The Bureau of 
Labour Statistics estimates that non–farm business productivity advanced at 5.2 % (year–on–year) in 
2001:Q4, bringing the annual average at 2.0 %. While lower than the average of 2.6 % growth during 
the 1995–2000 period, it should be stressed that was registered during a year of recession.  
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2. PRODUCTIVITY AND THE STANDARDS OF LIVING IN THE EU 
Since the beginning of the 1970s, the convergence process of the EU towards the 
United States standards of living, measured by GDP per capita has fluctuated 
between 65 % and 70 % relative to the United States benchmark. Although during 
the late 1980s the convergence process appeared to have resumed, this was short 
lived. By 2001 the ratio of EU to United States GDP per capita was 65 %, the lowest 
in more than a quarter century. Graph 1 shows trends in the EU and United States 
GDP per capita since 1970 to the beginning of the new century. 
During the second half of the 1990s, and following a period of substantial slowdown, 
the United States saw an acceleration in both labour productivity growth (from an 
average of 1.2 % in the period 1990-95 to 1.9 % in the period 1995-2001) and in 
employment growth (from 0.9 % to 1.3 %). In the EU, growth in labour productivity 
slowed down (from an average of 1.9 % in the first half of the decade to 1.2 % in the 
period 1995-2001) but employment growth picked up considerably (from a decline 
of 0.6  % in the first half of the decade to 1.2  % in the period 1995-2001). 
Employment expanded by 1.8% in 2000 despite the slowdown in the second half of 
the year. 
The overall EU performance masks important differences across the Member States. 
Austria, Greece, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden have recorded 
productivity growth in the second half of the 1990s close to or in excess of that of the 
US, and in the case of Austria, Greece and Ireland, this has continued into 2001. It is 
possible that this reflects the possibilities offered by the Internal Market, and the 
consequent increased competition, to smaller Member States that stimulated their 
commitment to develop strategies for taking advantage of ICT in the wider European 
market. 
The crucial challenge for the EU is to achieve such conditions where both strong 
productivity and employment growth contribute to growth in national incomes and to 
ensure that this is sustainable over the medium term. The Lisbon strategy has already 
recognised the significance of raising the employment rate in the EU and, to fulfil 
this ambition, a wide variety of initiatives have been undertaken or are being pursued 
(especially through the Luxembourg process) at the level of the EU and in the 
Member States
5. But achievement of the Lisbon goals hinges crucially on restoring 
durable growth in productivity in the EU. 
                                                 
5  For a review of progress made along the Lisbon objectives see The Lisbon Strategy – Making Change 
Happen, Communication from the Commission to the Spring European Council in Barcelona, 
COM(2002) 14 final, 15.1.2002.  
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Graph 1: GDP at 1995 market prices per head of population 
(left scale in 1995 PPP; 2001 est., 2002-2003 forecasts; right scale EU/US ratio) 
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3. THE ROLE OF ICT AND OF INNOVATION IN PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
ICT is a core element of the knowledge society and an important complement to 
R&D activities. ICT can be seen both as innovation per se and, due to its general–
purpose character, a vehicle for further innovations in various other sectors and 
fields. Unlike traditional types of capital investment, however, ICT represents 
general–purpose technology whose contribution to productivity and economic 
growth is greater than the direct effect of ICT producing sectors. ICT is also a central 
element in the innovation success of modern economies
6. 
A common characteristic across those Member States that have strong productivity 
growth comparable to or better than the United States in recent years is the pervasive 
use of ICT. A consensus has now developed that the resurgence of productivity 
growth in the second half of the 1990s in the United States and in some EU Member 
States is closely related to the use and diffusion of ICT that permeate a wide and 
ever–increasing set of economic activities. This resurgence is confirmed by industry-
level data where ICT production and the intensity of ICT use have become key 
explanations of productivity leadership. In fact, United States data suggest that the 
productivity revival during the second half of the 1990s has been very broad 
affecting a large number of industrial classes. 
                                                 
6  The performance of the EU and the Member States in innovation is reviewed in a variety of indicators 
presented in the European Innovation Scoreboard 2001, SEC(2001)  1414, 14.9.2001. While these 
indicators offer a mixed picture concerning the underlying parameters that influence innovation across 
the Member States (some signalling improvements, others not), the point remains that the EU under–
performs, especially when compared to the United States, in the economic and commercial exploitation 
of innovations and in innovation drive measured, for example, by patenting data.  
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The productivity gap between the EU and the United States in recent years is in part 
a reflection of the lower levels of ICT spending here. In the period 1992-99 ICT 
expenditure amounted to 5.6  % of EU GDP while in the United States it 
corresponded to 8.1  %. Indeed, in 1999 the ratio of ICT expenditure in the EU 
relative to ICT expenditure in the United States had declined to 75 % compared to 
90 % in 1992
7. 
Empirical estimates suggest that the contribution of ICT to economic growth in the 
EU during the second half of the 1990s is around 0.4 to 0.5 percentage points but in 
the United States the estimates range from 0.8 to 1 percentage points. It can be 
argued that the EU forewent on average between 0.3 to 0.5 percentage points of 
economic growth during the 1990s due to its lower investment in ICT
8. 
The benefits from ICT production and use materialise through various possibilities 
and through changes in a variety of business practices. Essentially, the role of ICT in 
enterprises is one of processing information and, thus, reducing co-ordination costs 
(for example, inventory management) that are endemic in a decentralised economy. 
Firms clearly benefit from improvements in the organisation of production and 
distribution, from better inventory management and from cost reductions associated 
with substitution of more efficient and powerful computers for certain categories of 
white–collar labour. Firms can thus respond more effectively to changes in the 
demand of their products. The use of ICT could also make possible an improvement 
in competitive conditions, thus increasing efficiency and reducing prices
9. Finally, 
the emergence of new industries and sectors has been only possible because of the 
intensive use of ICT. 
Productivity growth in mature economies is determined less by capital accumulation 
and more by innovation originating in private and public institutions and within 
firms. Therefore, the conditions that make innovation possible are very important, 
especially when combined with the conditions facilitating the use of ICT. A good 
example is the dramatic growth in biotechnology and life sciences in recent years, a 
growth that would be inconceivable without the diffusion and innovations associated 
with ICT
10. ICT in biotechnology has been crucial to stimulating and supporting 
complementary innovations as well as strengthening the growth of this industry
11. 
                                                 
7  For these estimates, see European Competitiveness Report 2001, op. cit., Table III.1 and Graph III.1. 
8 See  European Competitiveness Report 2001, op. cit., chapter III, where also some problems with the 
ICT data are mentioned; note, further, that there is uncertainty about the exact contribution of ICT to 
productivity growth. 
9  Although it is possible that it might facilitate price discrimination or product differentiation by 
providing firms with information about consumer preferences; see “The Microeconomic Impact of 
Information and Communication Technologies in Europe”, chapter 6 in The EU Economy: 2001 Review 
Investing in the Future, European Economy, no. 73, 2001. 
10  The role of ICT and innovation in the growth of biotechnology and the obstacles encountered is 
discussed extensively in the European Competitiveness Report 2001, op. cit., chapter  V and in A. 
Allansdottir et. al. (2002): Innovation and Competitiveness in European Biotechnology, Enterprise 
Papers No 7, Enterprise DG, European Commission. 
11  The importance of biotechnology for Europe’s future has now been widely recognised and the 
Commission adopted in January 2002 an Action Plan to support it; see Life Sciences and Biotechnology 
– A Strategy for Europe, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2002) 27, 
23.1.2002.  
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With ICT now playing a crucial role in the modernisation of our economies and in 
fostering innovation, it is essential to create conditions so that its diffusion is the 
widest possible. Some of these conditions, to some extend, have already been 
addressed in the Lisbon strategy, others have not. In particular, the issue of the 
Community patent has yet to be resolved. In addition, barriers to firm creation 
remain, industry/science relations in the Member States do not stimulate enough 
innovation, skilled labour shortages become acute at crucial stages of technological 
modernisation and the transition from the conception of an innovation to its 
commercial exploitation is often very difficult. These obstacles should be of 
particular concern in those Member States where productivity and employment 
growth has been notably weak in recent years. Clearly, much can be learned from the 
experience of the smaller EU Member States that have performed admirably well 
through the 1990s. 
4. PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN EUROPEAN MANUFACTURING IN RECENT YEARS 
Both in the EU and in the United States, productivity growth in manufacturing is 
highly correlated with those variables that reflect the firms’ capabilities, their use and 
exploitation of knowledge inputs, their use of ICT and their engagement in R&D 
activities. These factors are, of course, closely intertwined with the forces that 
manifest themselves in the process of innovation. In general, the evidence from EU 
and United States data indicates that high R&D intensity is never associated with low 
productivity growth while low research intensity is usually associated with low 
productivity growth
12. 
During the 1990s, and in contrast to the second half of the 1980s, productivity 
growth in manufacturing in the EU was lower than that in the United States. 
Furthermore, the acceleration in productivity growth in manufacturing between the 
first and the second half of the 1990s to 3.2 % was only 0.1 percentage points while 
in the United States, at 5.5  %, it was 2.3 percentage points. Thus, the pattern 
observed for the economy as a whole is also confirmed in the manufacturing sector. 
In the 1990s in the EU, technology–driven industries (pharmaceuticals, chemical 
products, office machinery and computers, electronic and TV and radio transmitters, 
medical equipment, etc.) saw the highest productivity growth, followed by capital–
intensive industries (textile fibbers, pulp and paper, man–made fibbers, iron and 
steel, non–ferrous metals, etc.). The latter, however, experienced the highest 
productivity growth during the first half of the decade. 
At the same time, in the United States, technology–driven industries have taken the 
lead in productivity growth throughout the decade. These industries have had a 
higher share in total manufacturing in the United States compared to the EU 
throughout the period since 1985 and this divergence has risen considerably over 
time. By 1998, for example, technology–driven industries represented around 35 % 
of manufacturing value added in the United States compared to around 24 % in the 
EU. The United States share has risen by almost 9 percentage points over the period 
1985–1998 while the EU share has increased by only 1.5 percentage points. 
                                                 
12 See  European Competitiveness Report 2001, op. cit., chapter IV.  
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Clearly, the low share in technology–driven industries in the EU is symptomatic of 
some potentially serious problems. It is not simply that these industries invariably 
lead in innovation and industrial efficiency but also that, by having a larger presence 
in value added, they contribute correspondingly more to aggregate productivity and 
real incomes growth in an economy. Furthermore, as vehicles for applied new 
technologies, these industries contribute to the wider diffusion of new technologies 
and to technological modernisation. Finally, the size of the technology–driven 
industry in an economy plays an important role in the transmission and adoption of 
technological advances across borders. The evidence from EU data suggests that, 
while the relationship between R&D and economic performance is weak within 
Member States, it is in fact substantially stronger across Member States, implying 
that there are significant international technology spillovers. These, of course, are 
dependent upon the size of the sector that propagates these spillovers but also due to 
the openness of the economies to trade. 
Partly as a result of such international technology and innovation spillovers, the 
pattern of productivity growth in manufacturing across countries has become more 
similar over time. There has been an increasing convergence across industries in the 
EU and the United States in productivity growth in recent years, unlike in the 1980s 
when United States productivity growth across industries was significantly different 
from the pattern in the EU. Nonetheless, the low share of technology–driven 
industries in the EU is a worrying feature at the background of the weak productivity 
and innovation record of recent years. 
The Lisbon Council emphasised the importance of new technologies and, in 
particular, ICT and innovation as well as the role of R&D in building Europe’s 
future. The Barcelona Council endorsed a target of 3 % of GDP in private and public 
R&D spending by the end of the decade, two thirds of which should be private 
R&D
13. 
5. PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN THE EUROPEAN SERVICE SECTOR IN RECENT YEARS 
The problem of weak productivity growth in the EU in recent years is particularly 
acute in the service sector. However, productivity in this sector is more difficult to 
estimate and, despite the fact that many ICT applications have been introduced 
vigorously in services, this apparently has not contributed to rapid measured 
productivity growth, or its acceleration, here. Indeed, the slowdown in aggregate 
productivity growth in the EU during the second half of the 1990s compared to 
earlier years, and the small acceleration in productivity growth in the manufacturing 
sector, suggest that the service sector will have seen a notable slowdown in labour 
productivity growth during this period. The problem is, of course, compounded by 
the fact that the share of services in EU GDP has been rising over time even though it 
remains considerably lower than in the United States economy
14. 
                                                 
13  See Presidency Conclusions – Barcelona European Council, 15 and 16 March 2002, point 47. 
14  Data on the service sector is not available on a comparable basis across the Member States and the EU. 
For those where such data exist, the share of the non-agricultural business sector services in GDP in 
1999 was 51.3 % (excluding real estate 41.2 %) in the United States and between 42.6 % (31.1 %) in 
Denmark and 49.0 % (39.1 %) in the United Kingdom; see European Competitiveness Report 2002, op. 
cit.  
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Productivity growth in business sector services in the United States accelerated from 
an average of 1.3 % in the period 1990–95 to an average of 3.1 % in the period 
1995–99. In contrast, with the exception of two (France and the United Kingdom) of 
the seven Member States for which comparable data are available, service sector 
productivity growth in fact declined during the second half of the decade, and where 
it rose it did so by a modest 0.1 to 0.3 percentage points
15. At the same time, while 
the United States saw a parallel increase in employment growth in the service sector, 
the general weakness in service sector productivity growth in the EU has been 
accompanied by an acceleration in employment growth. 
It is possible that measurement errors conceal the underlying productivity 
performance of the service sector. Measuring accurately the output of this sector, 
especially in a period of rapid technological change, is extremely difficult. If the 
inflation in the service sector is overstated (invariably because of difficulties in 
accounting for quality improvements following innovations and organisational 
changes) then the implicit productivity growth is understated. Extended to the 
economy as a whole, this suggests that European productivity growth may not have 
been as weak as prima facie the data suggest. 
Sectoral data indicate that productivity growth in wholesale and retail trade, financial 
intermediation and in renting and other services in the United States outdid the 
corresponding EU performance in the second half of the 1990s. The EU, on the other 
hand, recorded strong productivity growth in transport and storage, in post and 
telecommunications and in electricity, gas and water supply. The comparatively low 
GDP share of each of these sectors in the EU tends to reduce their impact on 
aggregate productivity growth
16. 
The service sector is an important user of ICT and, as mentioned earlier, lower levels 
of ICT expenditure are at the source of the recent slowdown in productivity growth 
in the EU. However, typically innovations in this sector are introduced through 
acquired technology – ICT, organisational changes and human capital – rather than 
through direct R&D spending by service firms themselves. Institutional factors could 
play a crucial role in this process. 
The service sector is generally characterised by below average productivity growth. 
Yet, because its share in GDP is increasing, the implied greater employment growth 
has not materialised sufficiently in the EU to make a decisive difference to Europe’s 
employment performance. Because of the rising demand for services as incomes 
grow, the EU must ensure that the potential employment gains associated with the 
growth of the service sector are realised. This requires that obstacles to the growth of 
the service sector be removed. 
Recent initiatives already, or to be, undertaken within the Lisbon/Barcelona 
framework ought to contribute to raising productivity growth and employment 
growth in the service sector. For example, there is some evidence that those Member 
                                                 
15 See  European Competitiveness Report 2002, op. cit. 
16  See for a detailed discussion of sectoral developments Employment in Europe 2001, European 
Commission, 2001, especially chapter 3. In particular, it was argued here that enterprise and 
competition policies would have the same effect in boosting productivity growth as employment 
policies since aggregate productivity growth reflected productivity improvements within sectors rather 
than changes in the sectoral composition of employment; see also the discussion in section 7 below.  
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States which liberalised and deregulated service sectors early had faster productivity 
growth than other Member States. For example Finland and the UK experienced 
higher growth in labour productivity in total business services during 1995-99 than 
the other EU Member States for which data are available. Thus, market liberalisation 
measures as well as steps towards a single market in financial services must be 
pursued vigorously. It is also essential to support incentives for innovation in the 
service sector. And, finally, the environment determining the performance of the 
distribution and of the retail sectors, including rules that govern the setting up of new 
firms should be eased especially without introducing new restrictions on the scale of 
operations of these outlets. 
6. HUMAN CAPITAL AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
A skilled labour force plays a fundamental role in economic and productivity growth. 
Investment in human capital (as well as the stock of human capital) in an economy is 
accompanied by significant externalities as the benefits accruing to the economy as a 
whole exceed the gains accruing to private individuals. These social benefits are 
associated with the complementarity of skills and knowledge in the development of 
new technologies, with the rate of innovation and with the creation of further 
knowledge that expands the range of technological and economic opportunities. It is 
crucial that the labour force in the EU possesses the skills that are necessary to 
realise Europe’s economic, social and employment ambitions.  
Clearly, human capital covers a broad range of skills, from those highly intensive in 
science and education to those developed through training and upgraded through life-
long learning. Productivity growth and economic prosperity clearly depend on skills 
and competencies that concern the whole of the labour force, and this is why it is 
essential in the EU that such competencies be developed across all skill categories. 
However, special concerns have appeared in recent years. In particular, the modest 
share of ICT in the EU has coincided with reported shortages of ICT skills in the 
second half of the 1990s which, in turn, has likely accentuated the problems of rapid 
ICT diffusion across the EU economies
17, affecting adversely productivity and 
income growth. 
Human capital, especially in technology–driven sectors, contributes to productivity 
growth both through the accumulation of knowledge and its diffusion and through 
the smooth matching of the demand for skills and their supply. As noted earlier, 
technology–driven sectors in the EU have led productivity gains and this is highly 
correlated with the fact that employment growth in these sectors, undoubtedly more 
human capital intensive than elsewhere in the economy, has been strong for a 
number of years now
18. Overall, the demand for labour in the EU in recent years has 
                                                 
17  This issue was briefly examined in European Competitiveness Report 2001, op. cit., Annex III.1. The 
problem of skill imbalances is particularly worrying since it has occurred in a period of chronically high 
(albeit declining) unemployment. See also European Central Bank (2002): “Labour Market Mismatches 
in Euro Area Countries”, March, for a more detailed discussion; the ECB finds that educational 
mismatch, in particular, was worse in 2000 compared to 1992. 
18 See  Employment in Europe 2001, op. cit., especially chapter 2. The strong employment growth in the 
technology–driven service and in high–education sectors in recent years (and the robust growth in high–
skilled non–manual professionals) is clearly at variance with the weak labour productivity growth 
registered by the service sector as a whole. This signals the possible presence of the measurement  
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shifted away from traditional skills towards modern and high–skilled human capital 
labour and it reflects changes in the content of jobs themselves rather than changes in 
the sectoral allocation of employment. 
Between 1995 and 2000 1.5 million jobs were created in the high-tech sector and 
5.5 million in high-education sectors, with high-skill non-manual jobs accounting for 
over 60  % of them. Job creation in fast-growing, knowledge-intensive, sectors 
accounted for more than two thirds of new high- and medium-skill jobs, and for 
practically all the employment growth of low-skilled employees. 
However, this increase in the employment of high–skilled labour (and a parallel and 
widespread decline in low–skilled labour) has not been matched by a corresponding 
increase in educational attainment. The growth rate of the latter has fallen short of 
the growth in the former, suggesting that between 1995 and 2000 labour markets in 
the EU became tighter
19. At the same time, however, there is evidence that the supply 
of skilled workers in the EU will undoubtedly improve in coming years. In younger 
age cohorts, in particular, educational attainment is closer to the skill characteristics 
of the demand for labour than it is in the adult population as a whole. Nevertheless, 
an uneven distribution of such characteristics across the Member States suggests that 
policies that support development of human capital are also different across the 
Member States; clearly, Member States that lag behind ought to catch up. However, 
in the short term labour mobility is an essential complement of matching demand for 
and the supply of skilled labour. 
Sustained income and productivity growth depends crucially on smooth adjustments 
in the labour market
20. Skill imbalances are invariably very disruptive of this process 
and preventing them is becoming an important challenge in an environment of rapid 
technological change associated principally with the expanding diffusion of ICT 
across industries and economies. During the current period of slow growth, and 
following the burst of the so-called dot.com bubble, it appears that the problem of 
skill imbalances may, in the short term, lose some of its urgency. However, given the 
on–going technological transformation, the skill intensity of our economies will 
increase. It is essential, therefore, that a network of coherent policies – education, 
science, training, mobility, etc. – reinforce each other to ensure that the emerging 
demand for skills is met on a durable basis without obstacles
21. These issues are 
central to the Lisbon agenda and the Commission has emphatically stressed the need 
for the Member States to make progress in the area of human capital development
22. 
Knowledge (and the capacity to use it effectively) is a key to the competitiveness of 
our economies. To ensure that the people of Europe have the required knowledge and 
                                                                                                                                                          
problems mentioned earlier. It could also reflect a lag between human capital accumulation and 
measured productivity growth very much in the same vein as when the initial surge in ICT investment 
did not translate into measured productivity growth until some years later. 
19 See  European Competitiveness Report 2002, op. cit. While similar trends occurred in the United States 
as well, increased immigration provided a partial solution to labour market tightness. 
20  See European Central Bank (2002): op. cit., for a discussion of the importance of an efficient matching 
process in the labour market in the Euro area in particular. 
21  With particular reference to science and technology, there are already worrying trends concerning the 
supply of these professionals in coming years; see Benchmarking National RTD Policies: First Results, 
Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2002) 129, 31.1.2002, and also European Central Bank (2002): 
op. cit., section 4 for a discussion of measures aimed at improving the functioning of the labour market. 
22 See  The Lisbon Strategy – Making Change Happen, op. cit.  
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skills, coherent strategies and practical measures fostering lifelong learning for all 
are to be developed and implemented
23. New ways of education and training have to 
be explored, and the use of technology for learning must be reinforced to facilitate 
access to and to increase quality of learning. 
The Commission has also recognised that mobility of researchers and skilled 
professionals is crucial to enhancing the transfer of knowledge and of technology 
across different actors in the European research and innovation system, including 
industry
24. Clearly, an extension of European Research Area to the rest of the world, 
and taking greater account of its international dimension, will undoubtedly benefit 
EU enterprises and will foster the entrepreneurial propensity of researchers, through 
the exchange of experiences and knowledge. These will also enrich Europe’s 
research capabilities. 
7. ENTERPRISE POLICY, COMPETITION POLICY AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
The complementary nature of enterprise and competition policies is recognised in the 
EC Treaty.
25 They are both cornerstones of the EU policy framework for achieving 
high and sustainable productivity growth, for that growth depends on a regulatory 
environment that enables enterprises to access new markets and to turn inventions 
into innovations. Thus the Lisbon goal calls for policies that establish an 
environment conducive to enterprise growth and innovation while ensuring that the 
market players are subject to uniform rules. Enterprise policy focuses on the first 
objective, while competition policy emphasises the second. But both policies 
contribute to high and sustainable productivity growth. Effective competition does so 
by inducing firms to search for efficiency-enhancing solutions that lead to product 
and process innovation. Enterprise policy does so by correcting market failures and 
enabling more firms to engage in market transactions, thus increasing the population 
of potentially innovative firms. 
The objective of making the EU a globally competitive knowledge–based economy 
implies that measures to support economic growth should not lead to centralisation, 
increased concentration or increasing state aids. Productivity growth is determined 
by improvements in the quality of inter–firm interaction, by the accumulation of 
knowledge and by market–based choice of best solutions. Competitive firms are the 
carriers of change, providing the link between abstract ideas and innovation–driven, 
growth–generating market evolution. Within this process, technical progress and 
organisational change are inseparably entwined. Innovative firms prosper in broad 
knowledge pools from which they draw inputs and into which they in turn contribute 
new knowledge. 
                                                 
23 See  Making a European Area of Lifelong Learning a Reality, Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament and the Council, COM (2001)°678 final, 21.11.2001. 
24 See  Mobility Strategy for the European Research Area, Communication from the Commission, 
COM(2001) 331 final, June 2001; the Commission’s interest in issues of mobility of professionals and 
researchers is long-standing, with an increasing emphasis in recent years, as can be seen in the various 
initiatives surrounding the 6
th Framework Programme. 
25  For a more extended discussion of this issue, see European Competitiveness Report 2002, op. cit.  
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Even though enterprise and competition policies share a basic view of market–led 
growth and are mutually reinforcing each policy has its own emphasis. They need to 
be balanced, as the following examples make clear. 
(1)  Proper product and geographic market delineation is crucial for competition 
decisions. This is so because the assessment of market power requires precisely 
defined markets. While market definition is not required for enterprise policy, 
its instruments – such as, the Internal Market legislation, standardisation and 
benchmarking – affect market structures which then are analysed for 
competition purposes. 
(2)  Co–operation between firms in the field of innovation and the creation of 
knowledge networks contributes to productivity growth. Such co-operation is 
mostly unproblematic for competition. However in some cases it can result in 
foreclosure of markets or prevent innovation by competitors. The challenge to 
the regulator (for example in the review of the technology transfer block 
exemption regulation and in modernising antitrust procedures) is to create a 
regulatory environment that fosters R&D co-operation and innovation while 
preventing anti-competitive practices that may reduce consumer welfare. In 
merger cases in innovative sectors, the balance must be struck between the 
need to reap economies of scale in R&D and the need to preserve sufficient 
competition between R&D knowledge pools. 
(3)  A competitive environment naturally drives firms to restructure or merge in 
order to gain productive efficiency. Efficient firms compete more vigorously, 
further reinforcing their competitiveness. This can lead to a virtuous cycle of 
increasing productivity. Competition policy has recognised this in the Merger 
Regulation, which offers a one-stop shop to facilitate industrial restructuring. 
The current Merger Review offers an opportunity to assess whether the 
existing tools could be improved. In particular, it offers an opportunity to 
decide whether the Merger Regulation should permit verifiable merger-specific 
efficiency gains to offset negative effects such as price increases caused by the 
creation or strengthening of a dominant position. 
(4)  Technological development and innovation, the drivers of increased 
productivity, are by their nature uncertain. Assessing their effects for future 
market dynamics and for future competitive conditions is a permanent 
challenge. Competition decisions can take such developments into account to 
the extent that their consequences are predicted with sufficient certainty. 
(5)  The Commission recognises the legitimacy of using state aid to address market 
failures. Areas such as R&D and access to risk-capital for new and innovative 
businesses are cases in point. However, the need to close productivity gaps 
between the EU and its competitors should not detract from the need for 
overall reduction in the volume of state aid or from to the need for continuing 
administrative simplification. 
Balancing enterprise and competition policy objectives is a concern of Commission 
policy, whose success will contribute to an environment supportive of economic 
growth.  
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8. ENTERPRISE POLICY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN MANUFACTURING 
Enterprises play a key role in generating income and employment, contributing to the 
economic and social dimensions of sustainable development. At the same time 
however, in common with other activities, enterprises inevitably exert pressures on 
the environment. Realising the Lisbon prospect of an EU GDP growth rate of 3 % 
per annum might therefore at first sight be seen as further increasing environmental 
pressures. Indeed, the Stockholm European Council recognised that the pursuit of 
economic growth and environmental protection should advance in parallel. 
The experience of the EU manufacturing sector shows that it is possible to combine 
higher economic growth rates with reducing environmental pressures. The Single 
Market programme and the progressive deregulation of markets through the Lisbon 
process have improved the economic performance of manufacturing, allowing the 
avoidance of a trade-off between economic growth and environmental impact. The 
additional resources thus provided for environmental protection have made it 
possible to meet the inevitably greater demands for environmental quality as society 
becomes richer. Environmental policies have, at the same time, set standards and 
provided incentives for industry to improve its environmental performance. 
Manufacturing has thus been able to achieve the phenomenon of the so-called 
environmental Kuznets curve, that as real output increases, emissions of pollutants at 
first increase but subsequently peak and begin to decline at higher output levels. 
Indeed, perhaps contrary to common belief, on the basis of best knowledge and 
available statistics, it appears that far from increasing, there has in fact been a decline 
in some of  the environmental pressures from manufacturing over the last twenty 
years
26. In these cases, EU manufacturing industry has therefore largely managed to 
decouple higher manufacturing growth from increased environmental pressure. 
A striking example of the progress made by manufacturing is the substantial 
reduction over the last twenty years in its emissions of the gases that cause acid rain, 
such as sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide. Graph 2 shows that, despite over a 
30  % rise in manufacturing production over the period 1980-99, emissions of 
acidifying gases declined by some two-thirds
27. Similarly, over the same period, 
industrial emissions of ozone-precursors have been reduced in absolute terms by a 
quarter. Production of ozone-depleting gases in the EU has now almost ceased. 
Meanwhile energy consumption has remained broadly constant since the mid-1980s 
despite the increase in manufacturing output. This has contributed to the reduction 
that has occurred in industrial emissions of greenhouse gases since the Kyoto 
baseline date of 1990. 
Between 1990 and 2000 EU manufacturing industry saw a 10,5  % reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions, making a major contribution to achieving the Kyoto 
objective. This progress resulted from a mixture of developments, some of which are 
unlikely to be repeated, in various sectors
28. Recent years have also seen some 
                                                 
26  These and related issues are discussed in European Competitiveness Report 2002, op. cit. 
27 See European Competitiveness Report 2002, op. cit., Graph V.8. The figures are adjusted for the one-
off effects of German re-unification. 
28  The Kyoto objective is an 8 % reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in 2008-2012 compared to 1990. 
Trends in emission reductions could change swiftly; current estimates suggest that the EU will not meet 
the Kyoto challenges without greater efforts.  
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stabilisation in industrial consumption of minerals and ores. Overall, the performance 
of EU industry compares favourably with that of United States industry. In the 
extreme case of acidifying emissions, the eco-efficiency of EU industry has 
increased almost twice as quickly as in the United States. 
Graph 2: Eco-efficiency of EU manufacturing industry: Acidifying emissions
(eco-efficiency, production, emissions; index 1980 = 100) 
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The gradual introduction of environmental policies has had a clear role in these 
developments. For example, the most significant decoupling of acidifying gases from 
economic growth was the result of staged national reduction programmes under the 
Large Combustion Plants directive of 1988. Environmental policy also played a key 
role in the phasing out of CFC ozone-depleters. Gradual policy progress has also 
been made in other areas. Manufacturing industry has responded to the increased 
intensification of environmental regulation by developing new technologies, 
improving its management practices, and greater investment in pollution prevention 
technologies. 
Nevertheless the environmental improvements have come at an important financial 
cost to manufacturing industry. Environmental expenditures by EU industry stood in 
1998 at EUR 32 thousand million, some 0.4 % of GDP or 2 % of industrial value-
added. A drift upwards in environmental protection expenditures has occurred since 
the early 1980s. It is clear that the additional resources made available by increased 
productivity, resulting from the economic reform process, have been essential for the 
successful financing of environmental progress combined with continued 
manufacturing growth. 
Further implementation of structural economic reforms and further environmental 
policies are needed to ensure the continuation of the avoidance of a trade-off between 
economic growth and environmental progress in manufacturing. Careful attention 
needs to be paid to the proper balance between further legislative requirements for 
environmental improvements and their costs to ensure that economic growth and 
environmental improvements are allowed to progress alongside one another. At the 
same time, the economic costs of non-action in terms of, for example, reduced public  
 18    
health or damages to buildings have to be taken into account. To facilitate this, the 
Commission has committed that all major new proposals be submitted to impact 
assessments, which take full account of their environmental, economic, and social 
consequences. Environmental policies should also utilise as far as possible the most 
efficient market-based instruments, such as emissions trading. Finally, in order to 
attempt to loosen potential trade-offs between economic growth and environmental 
pressures, the Commission’s Action Plan on Environmental Technology will 
stimulate the innovation and diffusion of environmental technology. This will 
increase the benefits of high environmental standards for competitiveness. Indeed, 
besides imposing costs to industry, environmental policies can also contribute to 
competitiveness and economic growth by inducing greater production efficiency and 
by creating new markets. To ensure the attainment of sustainable development in the 
economy as a whole, the lessons learnt from the good performance of manufacturing 
industry need to be learnt and replicated in other sectors. 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
Economic growth in the EU is unlikely to return to a sustainable strong path until 
productivity growth increases. Employment growth in the EU has traditionally been 
sluggish and although measures to stimulate its growth are being taken in accordance 
with the Lisbon agenda, economic growth in the near term will be determined by 
productivity growth. This means enhancing EU competitiveness. 
At Lisbon and subsequent meetings, the European Council has already called for 
initiatives to enhance EU competitiveness. Selective and ad hoc policies will not do. 
The set of policies called for under the Lisbon strategy needs to be fully 
implemented. As the Commission contribution to the spring European Council 
indicated, much greater commitment to implement the Lisbon strategy is necessary. 
Without such commitment, the objectives of the strategy will not be realised. 
It is difficult to attribute the poor performance of productivity growth to any 
particular factor. But there is wide consensus that ICT and innovation have played a 
crucial role in the acceleration of productivity growth in certain Member States and 
in the US.  
It is essential, therefore, to identify the policies that have been responsible for good 
productivity growth in certain smaller EU economies in recent years. It is also crucial 
to identify policy and other obstacles that have delayed the adoption and diffusion of 
ICT, innovation and research and development. This is especially necessary in the 
service sector as regards the diffusion of electronic commerce and the use of e-
business. This will inevitably require reforms in the telecommunications sector that 
will permit cost reductions and enlarge access across consumers and businesses. 
The quality of the labour force and the availability of skilled labour must be 
improved so that new technologies, innovation and research and development can be 
more readily exploited. Labour market institutions and policies must meet the needs 
of new technologies.  
The conditions that enable the expansion of the service sector must be completed. 
Full integration of service markets will encourage investment and strengthen 
incentives for the adoption of new technologies.   
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All policies must be implemented in a way that supports a dynamic, knowledge-
based society. Competition and enterprise policies, in particular, need to be 
permanently balanced in all fields of application. Their synergy must be fully 
exploited to improve the global competitiveness of European enterprises. 
Environmental sustainability must be achieved, extending the manufacturing sector’s 
recent environmental performance across other sectors of the economy. These 
initiatives require co-ordination and consultation across all EU economic policies. 
Only the modernisation of our economies will enable the EU to meet the economic, 
social and environmental goals of the Lisbon strategy. The EU’s performance on 
productivity growth during the period since 1995 will not do. If the Lisbon goal is to 
be achieved, the pace of modernisation must accelerate. 